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Corporate Liability for Conduct of a Foreign
Government: The Ninth Circuit Adopts a
"Reason to Know" Standard for Aiding and
Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act
EDWIN V. WOODSOME, JR. & T. JASON WHITE
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 18, 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found
triable issues of fact in Doe I v. Unocal Corporation, requiring a trial to
determine whether Unocal Corporation could be liable under the Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA) for alleged conduct of the Myanmar
Government related to a pipeline built in Myanmar in the mid-1990s. 1
The Ninth Circuit noted that Unocal chose to invest in a natural gas
project in Myanmar, whose government had been accused of past
human rights violations. Based on this fact, the court concluded that
Unocal had reason to know that the Myanmar government would
commit similar violations in conjunction with Unocal's investment in
the natural gas project.2 Therefore, according to the Ninth Circuit,
Unocal may be liable for aiding and abetting the Myanmar military's
illegal policing operations in the pipeline construction area.
In analyzing the international aiding and abetting case law, the
Ninth Circuit primarily relied on Prosecutor v. Furundzia, a case from
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The
1. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 WL
31063976 at *15, *17 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002). This decision is currently under review en banc.
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., No. 00-56603, 2003 WL 359787 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003). Accordingly,
the en banc panel may reject or alter the standard adopted by the Doe I court, discussed herein.
2. Id. at*17.
3. 38 I.L.M. 317 (Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1999), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/furundzij a/appeal/judgement/fur-aj000721 e.pdf.
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Ninth Circuit held that a private actor may be liable for the conduct of a
foreign country's military under an international aiding and abetting
theory.4 In Furundzija, a military commander was accused of assisting
his subordinates in wrongful conduct because he was present and in
command of the soldiers while they committed criminal acts.5 The
Furundzija decision was based on prior cases of military officials aiding
and abetting in committing human rights violations abroad, rather than
cases involving private actors accused of aiding and abetting
government officials, as in Doe I v. Unocal.
6
In the Ninth Circuit, an ATCA action must be premised on a
violation of a "specific, universal and obligatory" international norm.7
In applying the Furundz'a standard to a U.S. company for the conduct
of a foreign government, however, the Ninth Circuit has abandoned the
"specific, universal and obligatory" standard for determining
international law. As Judge Reinhardt recognized in his concurring
opinion, the majority's standard is based upon a concept of aiding and
abetting that is not part of customary international law, but is merely
"an undeveloped principle of international law promulgated by a
recently-constituted ad hoc international tribunal.",8 Doe I, therefore,
expands the potential liability for U.S. companies with investments in
third world countries such as Myanmar. The irony of the Ninth Circuit's
decision is that Congress expressly permitted Unocal's investment in its
sanctions legislation against Myanmar just a few years earlier. The
legislation permitted companies with existing investments in the
country, such as Unocal, to maintain those investments. 9
Additionally, contrary to Congress's determination, the Doe I
decision permits litigation that challenges foreign investment decisions,
even if the U.S. government has previously concluded that U.S. foreign
policy provides for such investments. In recent years, plaintiffs have
increasingly used the ATCA to assert claims against U.S. companies for
alleged human rights violations committed by the governments of
4. See Doe Iv. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *17.
5. See Furundzija, 38 I.L.M. at 328 (1999).
6. 2002 WL 31063976 at *36 n.26.
7. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475-76 (9th Cir.
1994).
8. Doe I v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *27. Judge Reinhardt refers to the Doe I
majority aiding and abetting standard as "novel," "uncertain," and "inchoate." Id. at *29-30.
9. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110
Stat. 3009-166 to 3009-167 (1996); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 368-69
(2000).
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foreign states in which they invest. 10 The Doe I decision will affect
those cases, as well as any untold future litigation involving U.S.
corporate foreign investment.
The facts of the Doe I decision further illustrate the massive scope
of potential future liability of U.S. companies. All responsibility for the
construction of the pipeline rested with Total Myanmar Exploration and
Production (Total), a French energy company, not Unocal. Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit found that the project would have occurred regardless of
Unocal's minority investment.'" Remarkably, the only fact that the
Ninth Circuit cited for its holding that Unocal aided and abetted the
Myanmar military was that Total met with Myanmar military officials
shortly after insurgents ambushed and killed five pipeline workers. 12
This Article summarizes the most relevant ATCA cases leading up
to the Doe I decision in Part II, and discusses the Doe I decision in Part
III. In Part IV, this Article discusses the international cases relied upon
in Doe L Part V explains why those authorities do not support the
majority's expansive theory of international tort liability.
This Article offers an analytical -framework that classifies the cases
into categories, which reflect the status of the defendant as either a
private actor or public official. The analytical framework will identify
the degree of culpability between the defendant and the wrongful
conduct. The Ninth Circuit previously held that the private actor must
"control" the state official to be liable for the official's wrongful
conduct. 13 The assistance that private actors provide to a government
official should therefore be significantly greater than that of a
government official to be liable as an aider and abettor, because private
actors do not control government officials. This Article concludes that
the Ninth Circuit should adopt a standard for aiding and abetting under
the ATCA that requires a mens rea reflective of the unique relationship
between private actors and governmental officials.
10. See infra Part II(B).
11. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 2001).
12. Total met with the Myanmar officials to ensure that the workers would not be near the
fighting between the insurgents and the Myanmar military. Unocal had no employees involved in
the construction of the pipeline, never met with or had any contact with Myanmar officials
regarding the pipeline, and was not aware of any improper conduct of the Myanmar military
during the pipeline construction. See Doe I v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *2-3.
13. The Ninth Circuit has previously held that the private actor must "control" the state
official to be liable for the official's wrongful conduct. Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1356-57
(9th Cir. 1981). See also King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1986) (requiring control
to establish causation).
2003]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ATCA
The ATCA has a limited legislative history. As one judge
expressed, "This old but little used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin;
although it has been with us since the First Judiciary Act. .. no one
seems to know whence it came."1 4 The ATCA was enacted as part of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, yet the House debates over the Judiciary Act
do not mention the ATCA directly or indirectly.
15
The ATCA states that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."'
16
Although the language of the statute is broad, the ATCA's history
suggests that its purpose was probably to ensure that U.S. federal courts
would have jurisdiction over claims with international implications, and
thereby prevent state courts from mishandling them. 7 Until 1980, no
case explicitly held that the ATCA provided a substantive cause of
action, and there were only two cases in which courts relied upon as a
basis for federal jurisdiction.'
8
A. Jurisdiction, a Cause ofAction, and the Judicial Standard Under the
ATCA
The ATCA first received new life from the Second Circuit in 1980,
after over 190 years of dormancy. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 19 the father
and daughter plaintiffs were citizens of Paraguay. They claimed that in
1976 the defendant, the former Inspector General of Police in Asunci6n,
Paraguay, kidnapped and tortured the plaintiffs' relative to death. The
defendant entered the United States in 1978 and was living in Brooklyn,
New York when the plaintiffs learned of his presence in the country.2°
The court found that:
14. IlIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
15. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782, 782-833 (1789).
16. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001). The ATCA as enacted in 1789 stated
that "the district courts ... shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several
states, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §
9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 76-77.
17. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104 n.10 (2d Cir. 2000).
18. Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607); see also Abdul-
Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 866 (D. Md. 1961).
19. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
20. Id. at 878-79.
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[I]n light of the universal condemnation of torture in numerous
international agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an
instrument of official policy by virtually all of the nations of the
world (in principle if not in practice) we find that an act of torture
committed by a state official against one held in detention violates
established norms of the international law of human rights, and
hence the law of nations.
21
In ascertaining the scope of the law of nations, the court stated that
one should look to "works of jurists, writing professedly on public law;
or [to] the general usage and practice of nations; or [to] judicial
decisions recognizing and enforcing that law."
22
Importantly, the court "updated" the ATCA by stating that "courts
must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has
evolved and exists among the nations of the world today., 2 3 After
examining various international authorities, the court found that the act
of torture by a state official violates the law of nations.24 Accordingly,
the court ruled that the ATCA provided federal jurisdiction in that
case.
25
Subsequently, in 1984, the D.C. Circuit struggled with the broad
scope of potential liability created by Filartiga in deciding Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic.26 The plaintiffs in Tel-Oren were survivors and
representatives of persons murdered in a 1978 armed attack on a civilian
bus in Israel. Plaintiffs filed suit against various Middle Eastern
organizations known to have supported terrorism, alleging various
tortious acts in violation of the law of nations, U.S. treaties, and the
common law.27
In affirming the district court's dismissal, the circuit court filed
three concurring opinions adopting different reasons for affirming the
result. Judge Bork and Judge Robb roundly criticized the Filartiga
decision that the ATCA provided an independent cause of action. Judge
Bork stated that "it is essential that there be an explicit grant of a cause
of action before a private plaintiff be allowed to enforce principles of
international law in a federal tribunal. 28 Although Judge Edwards
21. Id. at 880.
22. Id
23. Id at 881.
24. Id. at 884.
25. For a more recent treatment of the ATCA by the Second Circuit, see Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
26. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
27. Id. at 775.
28. Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).
20031
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
disagreed with Judge Bork and Judge Robb on their criticism of
Filartiga, he acknowledged what is even truer today than in 1984:
This case deals with an area of law that cries out for clarification by
the Supreme Court. We confront at every turn broad and novel
questions about the definition and application of the "law of
nations." As is obvious from the laborious efforts of opinion writing,
the questions posed defy easy answers.
29
After Filartiga and Tel-Oren, the circuits were split as to whether
plaintiffs needed an international statute that provided a right to sue
before courts could entertain an ATCA case alleging forced labor
violations. In 1994, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Filartiga in deciding
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation.30 Plaintiffs
were a large number of Philippine citizens who claimed they were
arrested and tortured during Ferdinand Marcos's presidency in the
Philippines. The Marcos court found that the ATCA provides an
independent cause of action by concluding that it "is unnecessary that
international law provide a specific right to sue .... [N]othing more than a
violation of the law of nations is required to invoke section 1350.,,3 1 The
Marcos court further stated that "[a]ctionable violations of international
law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory."
32
Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Marcos found that the plaintiffs successfully
alleged a cause of action under the ATCA because torture committed by
military intelligence officials is prohibited by the law of nations.33
The Marcos court's decision that the ATCA provides a cause of
action for all claims, however, is mere dicta. In 1991 Congress passed
the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), which granted a specific
cause of action for torture and murder.34 The plaintiffs in Marcos,
therefore, did not require the ATCA to maintain a cause of action for
federal jurisdiction; the jurisdiction was proper under the TVPA.
Although the Marcos ruling on the ATCA is not binding, it
29. Id. at 775.
30. 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
31. Id. at 1475.
32. Id. (intepreting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881; and Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781).
33. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d at 1474.
34. The TVPA states, in relevant part:
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation - (1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in
a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative.
Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
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demonstrates that Judge Bork's concerns expressed in Tel-Oren were
becoming less compelling to a federal judiciary as it continued to
expand the scope of the ATCA.
The Filartiga and Marcos decisions expanded the scope of the
ATCA significantly.35 If the ATCA were merely a jurisdictional statute,
as two Tel-Oren judges surmised, plaintiffs would need to invoke an
international statute or treaty that provides a right to sue. This would
eliminate many ATCA claims that do not allege torture or murder
because only a limited number of international statutes and treatises
provide such a right. Based on Filartiga and Marcos, however,
plaintiffs merely need to show that there has been a violation of an
international norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.
36
As noted below, the Doe I decision departs from the "specific,
universal and obligatory" standard by adopting an aiding and abetting
liability standard from a recent ad hoc criminal tribunal, and then
arbitrarily modifying that standard to fit the facts of the case.
B. Impact of the ATCA Cases on Foreign Policy
Filartiga and its progeny were watersheds for non-governmental
organizations that are averse to U.S. corporate investment in areas of the
world with burgeoning free market economies, such as Southeast Asia
and Africa. Subsequent litigation under the ATCA has exploded,
including lawsuits against Exxon Mobil,
37 Texaco, 38 Chevron, 39
Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,40 Ford Motor Company,4' Coca-Cola,42 and
various other U.S. corporations conducting business overseas.
The post-Filartiga ATCA cases generally involve foreign
nationals attempting to hold American companies that invest overseas
liable for alleged abuses committed by the host country's government,
35. The Eleventh Circuit has also recognized the ATCA as providing an independent cause
of action. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847-48 (1 lth Cir. 1996).
36. For recent ATCA decisions, see In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig.,
164 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Jo0 v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001)
(commenting on the ATCA in dictum); Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir.
2001).
37. Complaint, Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001).
38. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp.
2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
39. Fourth Amended Complaint, Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C99-2506 (N.D. Cal. filed
Aug. 30, 2002).
40. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. La. 1997), aff'd, 197 F.3d
161 (5th Cir. 1999).
41. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
42. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2001).
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military, or police. The cases are increasingly undermining American
foreign policy. For example, in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corporation,
43
eleven residents of the Aceh region of Indonesia filed suit in federal
court in Washington, D.C., claiming that the Indonesian military
committed human rights abuses against them in furtherance of Exxon
Mobil's operation of a natural gas facility. 44 The plaintiffs alleged that
Exxon Mobil assisted the military by providing financial support to the
military and by using the military to protect its operations.45
The Exxon Mobil court contacted the U.S. State Department for
assistance in the Court's assessment of the case's foreign policy
implications. The State Department wrote that the case "would in fact
risk a potentially serious adverse impact on significant interests of the
United States, including interests related directly to the ongoing struggle
against international terrorism. ' '46 The State Department also stated that
the Indonesian government "may respond to the litigation by curtailing
cooperation with the United States on issues of substantial importance
to the United States.' 47 The State Department also addressed the
following issues of importance:
The United States . . . is actively seeking to assist Indonesia in
reform efforts aimed at ending the kinds of abuses alleged in this
litigation. Through improved training and support of security
personnel, as well as judicial reform, these programs are designed to
establish a higher degree of professionalism and respect for
individual rights. Should the [Indonesian Government] withdraw
from these programs in reaction to the litigation, it will impact
adversely on our goal of improving Indonesia's treatment of all
members of its population, including the people of Aceh.
In our experience, the government and people of Indonesia react
most negatively to any perceived intrusion into areas of Indonesian
sovereignty. We anticipate that adjudication of this case will be
perceived in Indonesia as a U.S. court trying the [Indonesian
government] for its conduct of a civil war in Aceh. All of the human
rights abuses and injuries alleged in the complaint refer to conduct
claimed to have been committed by the military and police forces of
the [Indonesian government].
43. Complaint, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001).
44. Id. at 1-7.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1.
47. Id. at 2.
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This litigation appears likely to further discourage foreign
investment, particularly in extractive industries in remote or unstable
areas that require security protection.
[W]e note that increasing opportunities for U.S. business abroad is
an important aspect of U.S. foreign policy. Under the circumstances
presented here, the adjudication of these claims could prejudice the
Government of Indonesia and Indonesian businesses against U.S.
firms bidding on contracts in extractive and other industries.48
The State Department expressed similar views in Sarei v. Rio Tinto
PLC.49 The plaintiffs in Rio Tinto were residents of the island of
Bougainville in Papua New Guinea. 50 They alleged that the defendant's
mining operations on Bougainville destroyed the island's environment,
harmed the health of the islanders, and incited a ten-year civil war.
51
They alleged that the defendants were liable under the ATCA for war
crimes, crimes against humanity, racial discrimination, and
environmental harm in violation of international law.52 The Rio Tinto
court contacted the State Department for its view on the foreign policy
impact of adjudicating the Rio Tinto case in a U.S. district court. The
State Department stated that the lawsuit "would risk a potentially
serious adverse impact on the [Bougainville] peace process, and hence
on the conduct of [United States] foreign relations. 53
The State Department's concerns expressed in Exxon Mobil and
Rio Tinto are common to many other ATCA cases. ATCA cases, such
as Exxon Mobil and Rio Tinto, will discourage foreign investment
because U:S. companies will face uncertain litigation and liability for
the conduct of governmental entities that they cannot control. These
cases also discourage foreign countries from engaging U.S. companies
in projects, fearing that a U.S.-based judge without foreign policy
experience will subject them to international scrutiny.
Finally, citizens of foreign countries will suffer from the chilling
effect caused by the ATCA cases because less foreign investment
means fewer jobs and opportunities. As discussed below, the Doe I
48. Letter from William H. Taft, IV, The Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to Hon.
Louis F. Oberdorfer, District Court Judge for the District of Columbia, on whether adjudication
of the Doe I v. Exxon Mobil case would negatively impact the interests of the United States (July
29, 2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/ 2002/08/exxon072902.pdf.
49. Sarei v. Rio Tinto P.L.C., 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1180-81 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
50. Id. at 1120.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1181.
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decision merely exacerbates the State Department's foreign policy
concerns expressed in Exxon Mobil and Rio Tinto.
III. THE DOE I DECISION
In 1992, Myanmar awarded to Total the rights to explore for
natural gas in an area of the Andaman Sea. Total assigned to a Unocal
subsidiary an undivided 28% minority interest in Total's rights under
various contracts signed by Total and the Myanmar Government. A
separate company was formed to build and operate a pipeline that would
transport the gas from the Andaman Sea to the Thailand border. 54
The plaintiffs are former residents of the Tenasserim region of
Myanmar, the region that housed the pipeline construction. They allege
that they suffered personal injuries at the hands of the Myanmar military
in the area of the pipeline construction. Several of them also allege that
they were forced, without pay, to perform tasks for the military, such as
carrying supplies and constructing military barracks. 55
The Doe I majority found that, through international aiding and
abetting law, Unocal could be liable under the ATCA for the acts of the
Myanmar military.56 In adopting an international aiding and abetting
standard, the Court relied on a Yugoslavian war crimes tribunal case,
Prosecutor v. Furundzja,57 as well as several other recent war crimes
tribunal cases. As noted above, the Ninth Circuit has held that only
violations of "specific, universal and obligatory" international norms are
actionable under the ATCA.58 The majority rationalized its reliance on
these war criminal tribunal cases by stating that
[T]he standard for aiding and abetting in international criminal law is
similar to the standard for aiding and abetting in domestic tort law,
making the distinction between criminal and tort law less crucial in
this context. Accordingly, District Courts are increasingly turning to
the decisions by international criminal tribunals for instructions
regarding the standards of international human rights law under our
civil ATCA.
59
The majority adopted a modified version of the aiding and abetting
standard articulated in Furundzia. Specifically, the majority found that
54. Doe Iv. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *1.
55. Id. at *3-4.
56. Id. at*14-17.
57. Discussed infra Part IV(C)(2).
58. Doe Iv. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *8.
59. Id. at *12.
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under the ATCA a private actor may be liable for the conduct of a state
actor if he has "actual or constructive (i.e., 'reasonabl[e]') 'knowledge
that [the accomplice's] actions will assist the perpetrator in the
commission of the crime,"' 60 and provides "practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the
perpetration of the crime." 61 The majority then determined that the
moral support element, part of the aiding and abetting standard adopted
in Furundzia, was not applicable to the Doe I case because, according
to the majority, "we are not... 'bound' by every aspect of [the
Furundzia standard]. 62 Based on this truncated Furundzia standard,
the majority reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of
Unocal, and remanded the case to determine whether Unocal aided and
abetted the Myanmar military.63
Although concurring with the majority on the result, Judge
Reinhardt criticized the majority's adoption of a novel standard for
aiding and abetting liability. Specifically, Judge Reinhardt noted that the
majority's standard is derived from a recent ad hoc international
tribunal, whose interpretations are subject to change by the "future
decisions of some as-yet unformed international tribunal established to
deal with other unique regional conflicts. 64
As discussed in more detail below, the international authorities
relied on by the Doe I majority do not support its aiding and abetting
standard. An analysis of the international authorities also demonstrates
that the majority's standard, instead of being "specific, universal and
obligatory," is, as Judge Reinhardt stated in his concurrence, "novel,"
"uncertain," and "inchoate. 65
IV. INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES FOR AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY
This Part will examine the aiding and abetting standard applied in
other international human rights cases. They suggest that the Doe I
majority misinterpreted international norms by imposing a reason to
know standard, rather than actual knowledge or intent, for aiding and
abetting liability.
60. Id. at *13.
61. Id.
62. Id. at*13 n.28.
63. Id. at*17.
64. Doe I v. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *28.
65. See id. at *29-30.
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A. The Nuremberg Industrialist Cases, Aiding and Abetting Under
Control Council Law No. 10, Article II
After World War II, a number of German industrial leaders stood
trial for various charges stemming from their roles in the Nazi atrocities.
Many of the defendants were charged under Control Council Law No.
10, Article II. Article II states that "[a]ny person without regard to
nationality or capacity in which he acted, is deemed to have committed
a crime ... if he a) was a principal or b) was an accessory to the
commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same.,66
The following Nuremberg cases relying on Article II illustrate that
aiding and abetting liability under Article II requires willfulness, as well
as active and substantial participation.
1. The Flick Case
The Flick case 67 involved Friedrich Flick and five other executives
of Flick's steel companies, which controlled dozens of coal, iron, and
steel companies and plants in Germany.68 The six defendants were
charged with participation in the Third Reich's slave-labor program by
using prisoners of war in armament production between 1939 and
1945. 69Under Article II aiding and abetting liability, the prosecutor had
to prove that "the acts and conducts of defendants were committed
unlawfully, willfully and knowingly."
70
The court held that defendants Flick and Weiss were liable for
aiding and abetting Germany's slave labor program because each
defendant actively attempted to increase their allotment of forced
laborers that they used in their plants, while none of the remaining
defendants took active steps in procuring forced laborers. 71 Weiss, with
the knowledge and approval of Flick,. solicited increased freight car
production in order to ship more forced laborers to the Flick factories.72
The court stated that it "likewise appears that Weiss took an active and
66. Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against
Humanity, Control Council Law No. 10, v. 31.01.1946 (Official Gazette of the Control Council
for Germany S. 51), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonlimtlimtl0.htm.
67. United States of America v. Flick, 6 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (1952).
68. The Flick plants employed over 120,000 people. Id. at 1192.
69. Id. at 1190.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1198.
72. Id.
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leading part in securing an allocation of Russian prisoners of war for
use in the work of manufacturing such increased quotas." 73 Based on
these findings, the court held defendants Weiss and Flick liable as
aiders and abettors.74
The convictions in Flick turned on each defendant's state of mind.
The Flick defendants did not dispute that the plants were utilizing
forced labor and that each of them knew about the forced labor.
According to the Flick court, however, knowledge was not enough to
sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting.75 As demonstrated by the
evidence against the two convicted defendants, aiding and abetting
liability under Article II of the Control Council required the showing of
willful participation.
76
2. United States ofAmerica v. Carl Krauch
77
Similarly, in 1942, reports showed that the Farben Corporation,
including high ranking industrialist Krauch,78 used Polish prisoners of
war to construct a plant at Auschwitz. 79 The court found that the Farben
Corporation sought to employ forced labor. 80 As to defendant Krauch
specifically, the court found that "[i]t seems that Krauch is inextricably
involved in the allocation of labor to Auschwitz in a manner that
negatives his lack of knowledge of the employment of concentration-
camp inmates and forced foreign labor on the Auschwitz construction
project.
' 81
The evidence showed that Krauch not only knew about the use of
forced labor at his plants, but also intended to participate in the use of
forced labor. Indeed, several Farben officers were present to discuss the
construction of an Auschwitz plant which was to be owned by Farben.
73. Id.
74. The remaining defendants successfully invoked the necessity defense by arguing that
they were placed in the untenable dilemma to either placidly accept the forced labor program, or
suffer personal consequences. Id. at 1202.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. United States of America v. Krauch, 8 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 (1952).
78. Krauch worked under Goering, as Chief of the Department for Research and
Development in the commission of Hitler's four year plan. See generally TELFORD TAYLOR,
SWORD AND SWASTIKA, GENERALS AND NAZIS IN THE THIRD REICH 124 (1952) (providing the
story of the generals and the Nazis in their rise to power until 1939).
79. Krauch, 8 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under
Control Council Law No. 10 at 1181-1206.
80. Id. at 1186.
81. Id. at 1187-88.
2003]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The court found that Krauch also corresponded with high-ranking Nazi
leaders, showing his support for current labor practices.
82
3. The Krupp Case
Finally, twelve defendants in Krupp came to trial against charges
of violating Article II by aiding and abetting in the use of forced labor at
steel and armament plants owned by the Krupp concern. 83
The Krupp defendants were found to have taken active steps
throughout the war to procure and maintain the use of forced laborers in
the Krupp concern plants. In 1942, one defendant sent a Krupp
representative to Holland to request additional Dutch steelworkers from
German governmental officials. Based on the Krupp representative's
efforts, the Krupp concern increased their allotment of Dutch workers
from 33 in 1942 to 1,700 in 1943. A Krupp representative also went to
France and Belgium to procure additional forced laborers. In all, 30,000
workers skilled in the iron-producing trade were sent to Germany to
work in Krupp concern plants. Krupp officials then cooperated with the
German government to secure the return of any laborers that attempted
to escape.84
Evidence clearly established that the defendants willfully sought to
employ forced labor. For instance, in 1942, the German government
sent a message to one of the Krupp plants requesting information on
whether the Krupp firm could use skilled, foreign, Jewish labor, and
whether the plant could erect a concentration camp to house the
laborers. The Krupp plant sent a reply to the effect that it could use
1,050 - 1,100 Jewish workers if they were skilled.85
Additionally, one Krupp defendant met with Hitler in 1942 to
discuss the employment of concentration camp inmates. The meeting
was successful and in 1943 the Krupp concern started to employ
concentration camp inmates. By 1943, at the request of the Krupp
concern, the S.S. provided about 4,000 imprisoned Jews to work for the
Krupp plant's forced labor camp. For the Krupp defendants, the
82. Id.
83. United States of America v. Alfried Felix Awyn Krupp von Bohin und Halbach, 9 Trials
of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10
(1950).
84. See id. at 1398.
85. Id. at 1412-13.
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evidence clearly showed that each one intended to and did in fact
substantially participate in the use of forced labor. 86
B. In re Tesch, Aiding and Abetting Under Article 46 of the Hague
Regulations
The defendants in Tesch were accused of supplying poison gas
used for the extermination of prisoners at concentration camps. 87 The
defendants claimed that they were unaware that the S.S. was using
Zyklon B gas, which the S.S. had purchased from Tesch, to kill millions
of Jews at Auschwitz. 88 The defendants faced charges of aiding and
abetting the German government in violation of Article 46 of the Hague
Regulations of 1907. Article 46 states that "[fjamily honour and rights,
the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious
convictions and practice, must be respected.
8 9
Evidence at trial showed that Tesch knew that the gas was for
killing human beings. Tesch's former bookkeeper supplied evidence
that
Tesch recorded an interview with [Nazi officials], during which he
was told that the burial, after shooting, of Jews in increasing numbers
was proving more and more unhygienic, and that it was proposed to
kill them with prussic acid. Dr. Tesch, when asked for his views, had
proposed to use the same method, involving the release of prussic
acid gas in an enclosed space, as was used in the extermination of
vermin. He undertook to train the S.S. men in this new method of
killing human beings.,
90
Tesch and one of his associates were convicted and sentenced to
death. The prosecution's evidence overwhelmingly proved that Tesch
substantially participated in the use of Zyklon B gas at concentration
camps and intended its deadly results.
86. Id. at 1412, 1416-17.
87. In Re Tesch, 13 Ann. Dig. 250, 250-51 (1946).
88. Id.at251.
89. Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art.
46, 35 Stat. 2277, 2306-07.
90. The Zylon B Case, I Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 93, 95 (1946).
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C. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
1. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) has authority to prosecute persons who were responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia since 1991.91 Individual criminal responsibility is imposed
on those who "planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution" of crimes
enumerated in the ICTY statute.
92
2. Prosecutor v. Furundzja
As noted above, the Doe I majority relied most heavily on
Prosecutor v. Furundzja.93 In that case, local military police arrested a
Bosnian Muslim woman and took her to a house for interrogation.
While the defendant, a local military commander, questioned the
woman about listed names and her sons' activities, another soldier
assaulted and raped her. 94 The defendant came before the ICTY on
charges of aiding and abetting the assault and rape. The prosecution
argued that to establish aiding and abetting liability under the ICTY
statute, it need only show that the defendant intended to participate in
the organization and that his act contributed to its commission.95
After reviewing the international authority, the Furundzia tribunal
found that
knowledge of the criminal activities of the organisation combined
with a role in that organisation was not sufficient for complicity in
this case and the defendants' acts in carrying out their duties had to
have a substantial effect on the commission of the offence for
91. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, art. 1, U.N. Doc. S/25704/Add.1 (1993).
92. Id. at art. 7(1).
93. Furundzija, 38 I.L.M. at 317.
94. Id. at 328.
95. Id. at 329. See generally Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-A, 352-59, Feb. 20, 2001,
available at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/judgement/cel-ajOI0220.pdf (discussing the
standard for aiding and abetting to require more than mere knowledge and participation in an
organization, it also requires a requisite level of mens rea and perhaps a form of independent
authority).
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responsibility to ensue .... 96 [The ICTY concluded that] the
relationship between the acts of the accomplice and of the principal
must be such that the acts of the accomplice make a significant
difference to the commission of the criminal act by the principal.
Having a role in the system without influence would not be enough
to attract criminal responsibility.
97
As to the defendant's state of mind, the tribunal stated that the
aider and abettor need not know the precise crime that was intended and
that was in fact committed. 98 "If he is aware that one of a number of
crimes will probably be committed and one of those crimes is in fact
committed, he has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime,
and is guilty as an aider and abettor."99 It is far from clear, however, that
the Furundzia tribunal actually intended to establish a "reason to
know" standard as opposed to an actual knowledge standard. In
discussing the standard necessary for conviction, the tribunal only refers
to authorities requiring actual knowledge. 00 Thus, the ICTY statute, as
interpreted by the Furundzja tribunal, does not support the imposition
of ATCA liability as articulated by Doe I.
D. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
1. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has
authority to prosecute persons who committed genocide between
January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.101 Article 6 of the ICTR
statute establishes individual liability for those that "planned, instigated,
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation or execution" of the crime of genocide. 
02
96. Furundzya, 38 I.L.M. at 361-62.
97. Id. at 364-65. See generally Delalic, 346, available at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/
appeal/judgement/cel-ajO10220.pdf.
98. Furundzija, 38 I.L.M. at 366.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 370.
101. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess.,
3453d mtg., Annex, art. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
102. Id. at art. 6(1).
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2. Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda
In Rutaganda, the defendant was a Rwandan businessman and was
second vice president of the youth military of a national organization.'
0 3
He was charged with aiding and abetting in the commission of the
following crimes: (1) distributing guns that were used to kill eight
Tutsis at a roadblock, (2) participating in an attack at a school that
resulted in the death of a large number of Tutsis, (3) transporting those
that survived the attack to a gravel pit where they were killed, and (4)
conducting house to house searches of Tutsis and striking and killing a
person attempting to flee.'
0 4
The Rutaganda tribunal found the defendant guilty of aiding and
abetting in the preparation and perpetration of killings of Tutsis and for
having caused serious bodily or mental harm to Tutsis. The tribunal
further found that the defendant personally distributed weapons and
"ordered them to go to work" on the killings.10 5
As to the applicable mental state for aiding and abetting liability,
the tribunal required a showing of intent to cause the injuries.'0 6 For
example, the tribunal stated that the defendant "aided and abetted in the
killings.., and by his conduct intended to cause the death of a large
number of people belonging to the Tutsi ethnic group, because of their
ethnicity."' 7 Based on Rutaganda, the ICTR statute requires evidence
of intent to find a defendant liable for aiding and abetting.
E. International Law Commission Draft Code of Crimes Against The
Peace and Security of Mankind
In 1996, the International Law Commission released a draft Code
of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. The draft states
that "[c]rimes against the peace and security of mankind are crimes
under international law and punishable as such, whether or not they are
punishable under national law."' 08 Under Article 2, an "individual shall
be responsible for a crime.., if that individual knowingly aids, abets or
103. Prosecutor v. Rutanganda, No. ICTR-96-3, Dec. 6, 1999, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Rutuganda/judgement/9index.htm.
104. Id. 10-19.
105. Id. 389-404.
106. See id. 404-05, 416-17.
107. Id. 416.
108. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session 6
May - 26July 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 1(2), at 14, U.N. Doc. A/51/10
(1996).
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otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of such a
crime, including providing the means for its commission."' 0 9 The
commentary to aiding and abetting liability states:
This subparagraph provides that an individual who "aids, abets or
otherwise assists" in the commission of a crime by another
individual incurs responsibility for that crime if certain criteria are
met. The accomplice must knowingly provide assistance to the
perpetrator of the crime. Thus, an individual who provides some type
of assistance to another individual without knowing that this
assistance will facilitate the commission of a crime would not be
held accountable under the present subparagraph. In addition, the
accomplice must provide the kind of assistance which contributes
directly and substantially to the commission of the crime, for
example by providing the means which enable the perpetrator to
commit the crime. Thus, the form of participation of an accomplice
must entail assistance which facilitates the commission of a crime in
some significant way.I10
The draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind has not been adopted and the commission continues to revise
it. Accordingly, there has yet to be an international case discussing the
draft. The commentary suggests that knowledge is sufficient to establish
aiding and abetting liability. There is an implication, however, that one
who provides the type of significant assistance required by the draft
would also intend that assistance to facilitate the commission of a crime.
Until an international tribunal adopts and interprets the draft, however,
the proper interpretation of the statute remains unclear.
V. ANALYSIS OF DoEI
In crafting an aiding and abetting standard under the ATCA, the
majority in Doe I made a fundamental error in following the
international cases involving governmental officials accused of aiding
and abetting subordinates as opposed to following the cases involving
private actors accused of aiding and abetting government officials.
For purposes of an analytical discussion of Doe I, the international
authorities discussed above can be classified into two categories. The
first category is composed of cases that involve defendants who are
private actors assisting government officials in the wrongful conduct
(Category One). Category One is typified by the Nuremberg cases. The
109. Id. at art. 2(3)(d).
110. Id. atart.2cmt. 11.
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second category of cases involves defendants who are government
officials assisting private actors and/or soldiers in the wrongful conduct
(Category Two). War crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda are representative of Category Two.
The distinction between the actions of private actors as opposed to
government officials is important in determining the appropriate
standard for aiding and abetting liability. The role of a private entity that
invests in a country accused of engaging in human rights violations is
far different from the role of a military officer, such as the defendant in
Furundzyia, who encouraged his subordinates to commit unlawful acts.
In determining the appropriate legal standard to apply to Unocal's
alleged conduct, the district court correctly looked to Category One
cases because those cases involved private actors accused of aiding and
abetting the government. The district court ruled that the proper
standard for determining whether Unocal was liable for aiding and
abetting the Myanmar military was if they actively participated in the
alleged wrongful conduct; 11' that is, if they were complicit in that
conduct in a manner equivalent to that of a co-conspirator. The district
court stated:
The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs that these cases hold that an
industrialist is liable where he or she has knowledge that someone
else would commit abuses. Rather, liability requires participation or
cooperation in the forced labor practices. In the Flick Case, Weiss
took "active steps" with the "knowledge and approval" of his
superior to procure forced laborers so that the company could
increase its production quota. The Tribunal's guilty verdict rested not
on the defendants' knowledge and acceptance of benefits of the
forced labor, but on their active participation in the unlawful
conduct.112
The Doe I majority rejected that argument because it found that the
active participation standard applied only as a way to overcome the
necessity defense." 3 That argument, however, does not withstand
scrutiny. Many corporations in Germany and elsewhere purchased steel
from the Flick companies knowing that the Flick plants used forced
labor."14 No one would argue that those companies could invoke the
111. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1310 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
112. Id. at 1310.
113. Doe Iv. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *10.
114. See Peter Gumbel & Terence Roth, Flick Indiustrial Empire Points Up Waning Role of
German Family-un Finns, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1985, at 35 Friedrich Flick later became known
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necessity defense because each one of those companies could choose
where to purchase its steel and, presumably, would not be faced with
personal repercussions for choosing not to conduct business with the
Flick companies. Yet none of the individuals who ran those companies
were brought to trial at Nuremberg. If knowledge and participation were
enough to establish aiding and abetting liability under Article II,
certainly many German purchasers of Flick steel would have been
criminally liable. 1
5
The court's proposition is impractical and the mens rea for aiding
and abetting under Article II of the Control Council Law would not
support such expansive liability. The necessity defense enabled the
Nuremberg court to separate between those defendants who intended for
the wrongful conduct to occur, thereby satisfying the mens rea of aiding
and abetting liability, and those who did not. Accordingly, the active
participation standard adopted by the district court and applied in the
Nuremberg cases is equally applicable under the ATCA.
After rejecting the district court's ruling on the "active
participation" standard, the Doe I majority turned to the ICTY to
substantiate a much broader aiding and abetting standard than could be
justified under the Nuremberg cases. One court recently noted that
aiding and abetting liability may be appropriate in cases involving
military officials and subordinates because "[m]ost of the time" war
crimes "do not result from the criminal propensity of single individuals
but constitute manifestations of collective criminality: the crimes are
often carried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance of a
common criminal design."116 The majority, however, failed to discuss
how the Furundzya standard, adopted in a case where a ranking military
commander directed and encouraged his subordinates to commit
unlawful acts, could rationally apply to private actors. The holding of
Furundzja has little to do with whether a private company investing in
a foreign country should be liable for the conduct of a sovereign
military force with whom it does not conspire and that it does not
control. The court cannot reasonably stretch liability to such an extent.
as "Frederick the Great," due to his reputation for building a steel empire, ultimately with annual
sales in the billions of dollars. Id.
115. Plaintiffs attempting to expand ATCA liability to indirect participants have been
unsuccessful. E.g. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 485 (declining to decide forced labor claims that
arise out of war under the political question doctrine).
116. Barrueto v. Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (quoting Prosecutor v.
Tadic, No. IT-94-I-A, Judgment (1999) at 191).
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The Doe I majority also failed to follow the Ninth Circuit mandate
that actions may be maintained under the ATCA only if it is based upon
a "specific, universal and obligatory" international norm."l 7 The
majority noted that "[t]he Furundzya standard for aiding and abetting
liability under international criminal law can be summarized as knowing
practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.'" 118 Instead of
adopting the Furundzia standard, the majority found the "application of
a slightly modified Furundzia standard appropriate in the present
case. ' 119 Accordingly, the majority's aiding and abetting standard is
merely an ad hoc determination based on the facts of the case, and is
not, as previously required under Ninth Circuit law, specific, universal
or obligatory.
VI. CONCLUSION
The international aiding and abetting case law discussed in this
article shows that a private actor cannot be liable as an aider and abettor
for a government's conduct unless he intends for the wrongful acts to
occur. This Article suggests that courts addressing future ATCA cases
adopt the analytical framework discussed in this article so that private
actors will not be held to the same aiding and abetting standard as
government officials. The international authority shows that, to be liable
for aiding and abetting, one must actually participate in the wrongful
acts with the conscious desire to have them occur. Thus, aiding and
abetting liability must be viewed as equivalent to the crime of
conspiracy in terms of the mens rea required for the commission of an
offense.
In adopting a modified aiding and abetting standard under
Furundzia, the Ninth Circuit created a new standard of liability for U.S.
companies investing in foreign countries. Plaintiff lawyers can be
expected to argue that the Ninth Circuit's Doe I decision creates a
"foreseeability" standard for aiding and abetting liability under the
ATCA. The scope of that standard undoubtedly will be tested in the
avalanche of future ATCA cases that are sure to follow Doe L
117. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d at 1475-76.
118. Doelv. Unocal, 2002 WL 31063976, at *13.
119. Id.at*13.
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